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Abstract
According to actual needs, generalized signcryption scheme can flexibly work
as an encryption scheme, a signature scheme or a signcryption scheme. In
this paper, firstly, we give a security model for identity based generalized
signcryption which is more complete than existing model. Secondly, we pro-
pose an identity based generalized signcryption scheme. Thirdly, we give
the security proof of the new scheme in this complete model. Comparing
with existing identity based generalized signcryption, the new scheme has
less implementation complexity. Moreover, the new scheme has comparable
computation complexity with the existing normal signcryption schemes.
Keywords: Generalized signcryption, Signature, Encryption, Bilinear
pairing, Identity based cryptography
1. Introduction
Encryption and signature are fundamental tools of Public Key Cryptog-
raphy for confidentiality and authenticity respectively. Traditionally, these
two main building-blocks have been considered as independent entities. How-
ever, these two basic cryptographic techniques may be combined together
in various ways, such as sign-then-encrypt and encrypt-then-sign, in many
applications to ensure privacy and authenticity simultaneously. To enhance
efficiency, Zheng [17] proposed a novel conception named signcryption, which
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can fulfill both the functions of signature and encryption in a logical step.
Comparing with the traditional methods, signcryption has less computation
complexity, less communication complexity and less implementation com-
plexity. Just because signcryption scheme has so many advantages and ex-
tensive application prospective, many public key based signcryption schemes
have been proposed [18, 2, 10, 8].
Identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [15] in 1984, in
which the public keys of users are respectively their identities and the secret
keys of users are created by a credit third party named Public Key Generator
(PKG). In this way, the identity-based cryptography greatly relieves the bur-
den of public key management and provides a more convenient alternative to
conventional public key infrastructure. In [15], Shamir proposed an identity
based signature scheme but for many years there wasn’t an identity based
encryption scheme. Until 2001, Boneh and Franklin[1] using bilinear pairing
gave a practical secure identity based encryption scheme. The first identity
based signcryption scheme was proposed by Malone-Lee [13] along with a
security model. Since then, many identity based signcryption schemes are
proposed [12, 3, 7, 5].
Signcryption has considered these application environments that need
simultaneous message privacy and data integrity. However, in some applica-
tions, these two properties are not essential. That is, sometimes only mes-
sage confidentiality is needed or sometimes only authenticity is needed. In
this case, in order to ensure privacy or authenticity separately, signcryption
must preserve sign module or encryption module, which must increase the
corresponding computation complexity and implementation complexity. To
decrease implementation complexity, Han et al. [9] proposed a new primitive
called generalized signcryption, which can work as an encryption scheme, a
signature scheme or a signcryption scheme, and gave an generalized sign-
cryption based on ECDSA. Wang et al. [16] gave the formal security notions
for this new primitive and improved the original generalized signcryption
proposed by Han et al. [9]. In [16], Wang et al. pointed out some open
problems. One of theses problems is to enhance efficiency. Another of theses
problems is to design identity based generalized signcryption scheme.
Lal et al. [11] gave an identity based generalized signcryption scheme
(IDGSC). However, after much study, we find his security model is not com-
plete. And his scheme is not secure under the complete security model for
IDGSC. In this paper, our main works include three aspects. Firstly, in the
second section, we give the definition of IDGSC and the security model for
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IDGSC. Secondly, in Section 3, we propose an efficient IDGSC. Thirdly, in
Section 4, we give the efficiency analysis and security results.
2. IDGSC and Its Security Notions
2.1. Definition of IDGSC
Firstly, we will review the algorithm constitution of identity based en-
cryption (IDEC), identity based signature (IDSG) and identity based sign-
cryption (IDSC). Then, we will introduce the algorithms that consist of an
identity based generalized signcryption (IDGSC).
Definition 1. A normal identity based encryption scheme
IDEC = (Setup, Extract, Encrypt,Decrypt)
consists of four algorithms.
Setup: This is the system initialization algorithm. On input of the security
parameter 1k, this algorithm generates the system parameters params and
the PKG generates his master key s and public key PPub. The global pub-
lic parameters include params and PPub. We write ((params, PPub), s) ←
Setup(1k).
Extract: This is the user key generation algorithm. Given some user’s
identity ID, PKG uses it to produce a pair of corresponding public/private
keys. We write (SID, QID)← Extract(ID, s).
Encrypt: It takes as input a receiver’s identity IDr and a message m, using
the public parameters (params, PPub), outputs a ciphertext ε. We write
ε← Encrypt(IDr, m).
Decrypt: It takes as input a receiver’s private key Sr and a ciphertext ε,
using the public parameters (params, PPub), outputs a message m or the
invalid symbol ⊥. We write m← Decrypt(Sr, ε).
Definition 2. A normal identity based signature scheme
IDSG = (Setup, Extract, Sign, V erify)
consists of four algorithms.
Setup: It is the same as the corresponding Setup algorithm in Definition 1.
Extract: It is the same as the Extract algorithm in Definition 1.
Sign: This algorithm takes as input a signer’s private key Ss and a message
m, using the public parameters (params, PPub), outputs a signature σ. We
write σ ← Sign(Ss, m).
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Verify: This algorithm takes as input the signer’s public key Qs, a message
m and the corresponding signature σ, and outputs the valid symbol ⊤ or the
invalid symbol ⊥. We write (⊤ or⊥)← V erify(Qs, m, σ).
Definition 3. A normal identity based signcryption scheme
IDSC = (Setup, Extract, Signcrypt, Unsigncrypt)
consists of four algorithms.
Setup: It is the same as the corresponding Setup algorithm in Definition 1.
Extract: It is the same as the Extract algorithm in Definition 1.
Signcrypt: This algorithm takes as input the sender’s private key Ss, the
receiver’s public key Qr and a message m, using the public parameters
(params, PPub), outputs a ciphertext δ. We write δ ← SC(Ss, Qr, m).
Unsigncrypt: This algorithm takes as input the sender’s public key Qs,
the receiver’s secret key Sr and a ciphertext δ, using the public parameters
(params, PPub), outputs a message m or the invalid symbol ⊥. We write
m← UC(Qs, Sr, δ).
Generalized signcryption scheme can work as encryption scheme, sig-
nature scheme and signcryption scheme according to different needs. Let
IDSG = (Setup, Extract, Sign, V erify), IDEC = (Setup, Extract, Encryp
t,Decrypt) and IDSC = (Setup, Extract, Signcrypt, Unsigncrypt) respec-
tively be an identity based signature scheme, encryption scheme and sign-
cryption scheme.
Definition 4. An identity based generalized signcryption scheme IDGSC =
(Setup, Extract, GSC,GUC)consists of following four algorithms:
Setup: It is the same as the corresponding Setup algorithm in Definition 1.
Extract: It is the same as the Extract algorithm in Definition 1.
GSC: for a message m,
-When IDs ∈ Φ(IDs = 0), ε← GSC(Φ, Qr, m) = Encrypt(Qr, m).
-When IDr ∈ Φ(IDr = 0), σ ← GSC(Ss,Φ, m) = Sign(Ss, m).
-When IDs /∈ Φ, IDr /∈ Φ, δ ← GSC(Ss, Qr, m) = SC(Ss, Qr, m).
GUC: to unsigncryt a ciphertext δ,
-When IDs ∈ Φ(IDs = 0), m← GUC(Φ, Qr, ε) = Decrypt(Qr, ε).
-When IDr ∈ Φ(IDr = 0), (⊤,⊥)← GUC(Ss,Φ, σ) = V erify(Ss, σ).
-When IDs /∈ Φ, IDr /∈ Φ, m← GUC(Qs, Sr, δ) = UC(Qs, Sr, δ).
2.2. Security models for IDGSC
In our security model, there are seven types of queries that the adver-
sary A may inquire the challenger C for answers. In the following text,
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“Alice{Text1} → Bob, and then Bob{Text2} → Alice” denotes that Alice
submits Text1 to Bob, and then Bob responds with Text2 to Alice.
Extract query: A{ID} → C, and then C{SID = Extract(ID)} → A
Sign query: A{IDs, m} → C, and then C{σ = Sign(Ss, m)} → A
Verify query: A{IDs, σ} → C, and then C{(⊤ or⊥) = V erify(Qs, σ)} → A
Encrypt query: A{IDr, m} → C, and then C{ε = Encrypt(Qr, m)} → A
Decrypt query: A{IDr, ε} → C, and then C{m = Decrypt(Sr, ε)} → A
GSC query: A{IDs, IDr, m} → C, and then C{δ = GSC(Ss, Qr, m)} → A
GUC query: A{IDs, IDr, δ} → C, and then C{m = GUC(Qs, Sr, δ)} → A
The generalized signcryption can work in three modes: in signature mode,
in encryption mode and in signcryption mode, denoted IDGSC-IN-SG, IDGSC-
IN-EN and IDGSC-IN-SC respectively. Firstly, we define the confidentiality
of IDGSC-IN-EN (Def. 5) and IDGSC-IN-SC (Def. 6) separately.
Definition 5. IND-(IDGSC-IN-EN)-CCA Security
Consider the following game played by a challenger C and an adversary
A.
Game 1
Initialize. Challenger C runs Setup(1k) and sends the public parameters
(params, PPub) to the adversary A. C keeps master key s secret.
Phase 1. In Phase 1, A performs a polynomially bounded number of above
seven types of queries. These queries made by A are adaptive; that is every
query may depend on the answers to previous queries.
Challenge. The adversary A chooses two identities IDA = 0, IDB 6= 0 and
two messagesm0, m1. Here, the adversary A cannot have asked Extract query
on IDB in Phase 1. The challenger C flips a fair binary coin γ, encrypts mγ
and then sends the target ciphertext ε∗ to A.
Phase 2. In this phase, A asks again a polynomially bounded number of
above queries just with a natural restriction that he cannot make Extract
queries on IDB, and he cannot ask Decrypt query on target ciphertext ε
∗.
Guess. Finally, A produces his guess γ
′
on γ, and wins the game if γ
′
= γ.
A’s advantage of winning Game 1 is defined to be Advind−cca2
Aidgsc−in−en
(t, p) =
|2P [γ
′
= γ] − 1|. We say that identity based generalized signcryption in
encryption mode is IND-(IDGSC-IN-EN)-CCA secure if no polynomially
bounded adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in Game 1.
Definition 6. IND-(IDGSC-IN-SC)-CCA Security
Consider the following game played by a challenger C and an adversary
A.
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Game 2
Initialize. and Phase 1.
Challenger C and adversary A act the same as what they do in the cor-
responding stage in Game 1.
Challenge. The adversary A chooses two identities IDA 6= 0, IDB 6= 0 and
two messagesm0, m1. Here, the adversary A cannot have asked Extract query
on IDB in Phase 1. The challenger C flips a fair binary coin γ, signcrypts
mγ and then sends the target ciphertext δ
∗ to A.
Phase 2. In this phase, A asks a polynomially bounded number of above
queries just with a natural restriction that he cannot make Extract queries
on IDB, and he cannot ask Unsigncrypt query on target ciphertext δ
∗.
Guess. Finally, A produces his guess γ
′
on γ, and wins the game if γ
′
= γ.
A’s advantage of winning Game 1 is defined to beAdvind−cca2
Aidgsc−in−sc
(t, p) =
|2P [γ
′
= γ] − 1|. We say that identity based generalized signcryption in
signcryption mode is IND-(IDGSC-IN-SC)-CCA secure if no polynomially
bounded adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in Game 2.
Note 1. The differences between Def. 5 and Def. 6 deserve to be men-
tioned. Firstly, in Phase 2 of Def. 5, the adversary is prohibited from making
Decrypt query on the challenge ciphertext. However, he can transform the
challenge ciphertext into some valid signcryption ciphertext and make Un-
signcrypt query on the corresponding signcryption ciphertext. Secondly, the
adversary is restricted not to make Unsigncrypt query on the challenge ci-
phertext in Phase 2 of Def. 6. But, he can transform the challenge ciphertext
into some valid encryption ciphertext and make Decrypt query on the cor-
responding encryption ciphertext. Such differences are not considered in the
security model proposed by S. Lal et al. [11].
Secondly, we define the unforgeability of IDGSC-IN-SG (Def.7) and IDGSC-
IN-SC (Def.8) separately.
Definition 7. EF-(IDGSC-IN-SG)-ACMA Security
Consider the following game played by a challenger C and an adversary
A.
Game 3
Initialize. Challenger C runs Setup(1k) and sends the public parameters
(params, PPub) to the adversary A. C keeps the master key s secret.
Probe. In this phase, A performs a polynomially bounded number of above
seven kinds of queries.
Forge. Finally, A produces two identities IDA, IDB, where IDB = 0, and
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a ciphertext σ∗ = (X∗, m∗, V ∗). The adversary wins the game if: IDA 6= 0;
V erify(m∗, IDA, (X
∗, V ∗)) = ⊤; no Extraction query was made on IDA;
(X∗, V ∗) was not result from Sign(m∗) query with signer IDA.
We define the advantage of A to be advef−acma
Aidgsc−in−sg
(t, p) = Pr[Awins]. We
say that an identity based generalized signcryption in signature mode is EF-
(IDGSC-IN-SG)-ACMA secure if no polynomially bounded adversary has a
non-negligible advantage in Game 3.
Definition 8. EF-(IDGSC-IN-SC)-ACMA Security
Consider the following game played by a challenger C and an adversary
A.
Game 4
Initialize. Challenger C runs Setup(1k) and sends the public parameters
(params, PPub) to the adversary A. C keeps the master key s secret.
Probe. In this phase, A performs a polynomially bounded number of above
seven kinds of queries.
Forge. Finally, A produces two identities IDA, IDB, and a ciphertext σ
∗ =
(X∗, C∗, V ∗). Let m∗ be the result of unsigncrypting δ∗ under the secret key
corresponding to IDB.The adversary wins the game if: IDA 6= 0; IDA 6=
IDB; V erify(m
∗, IDA, (X
∗, V ∗)) = ⊤; no Extraction query was made on
IDA; (δ
∗, IDA, IDB) wasn’t outputs by a Signcrypt query.
We define the advantage of A to be Advef−acma
Aidgsc−insc
(t, p) = Pr[Awins].
We say that an identity based signcryption in signcryption mode is EF-
(IDGSC-IN-SC)-ACMA secure if no polynomially bounded adversary has a
non-negligible advantage in Game 4.
Note 2. The differences between Def. 7 and Def. 8 also need to be
noticed. In Def. 7, the forged signature is not obtained from the Sign query.
But it can be transformed from some valid signcryption ciphertext that is
gotten from Signcrypt query. In contrast, in Def. 8, the forged signcryption
cipherxt is not the output of Signcrypt query. But it can be transformed
from some answer of the Sign query. Such differences are not considered in
the security model proposed by S. Lal et al. [11]. Consequently, in S. Lal
et al. [11]’s scheme, adversary can easily forge a valid signature through a
correspondingly Signcrypt query and Unsigncrypt query.
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3. Our Scheme
3.1. Description of our scheme
Before describing our scheme we need to define a special function f(ID),
where ID ∈ {0, 1}n1. If identity is vacant, that is ID ∈ Φ, let ID = 0,
f(ID) = 0; in other cases, f(ID) = 0. The concrete algorithms of our
scheme are described as follows.
Setup: Given the security parameter 1k, this algorithm outputs: two cycle
groups (G1,+) and (G2, ·) of prime order q, a generator P of G1, a bilinear
map eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2 between G1 and G2, four hash functions:
H0 : {0, 1}
n1 → G∗1 ; H1 : G2 → {0, 1}
n2 × {0, 1}n1 ×G∗1 ;
H2 : {0, 1}
n2 × {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n1 → Z∗q ; H3 : {0, 1}
n2 ×G1 → Z
∗
q .
Where n1 and n2 respectively denote the bit length of user’s identity and
the message. Here H0, H1 needs to satisfy an additional property: H0(0) =
ϑ,H1(1) = 0, where ϑ denotes the infinite element in group G1.The sys-
tem parameters are params = {G1, G2, q, n1, n2, eˆ, P,H0, H1, H2, H3}. Then,
PKG chooses s randomly from Z∗q as his master key, and computes PPub =
sP as his public key. The global public parameters are (params, PPub) =
{G1, G2, q, n1, n2, eˆ, P, PPub, H0, H1, H2, H3}.
Extract: each user in the system with identity IDU , his public key QU =
H0(IDU) is a simple transform from his identity. Then PKG computes pri-
vate key SU = sQU for IDU .
Generalized Signcryption: Suppose Alice with identity IDA wants to
send message m to Bob whose identity is IDB, he does as following:
- Computes f(IDA) and f(IDB).
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||IDA||IDB) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2P + f(IDA) · h3 · SA).
- Computes QB = H0(IDB) and w = eˆ(PPub, QB)
r·f(IDB).
- Computes h1 = H1(w) and y = m||IDA||V ⊕ h1.
- Sends (X, y) to Bob.
Generalized Unsigncryption: After receiving (X, y):
- Computes f(IDB).
- Computes w = eˆ(X,SB)
f(IDB), h1 = H1(w), m||IDA||V = y ⊕ h1.
- Computes h2 = H2(m||IDA||IDB) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P )h2 · eˆ(PPub, QA)
h3·f(IDA), if not, returns⊥.
Else, returns m.
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3.2. Correctness
There are three cases to be considered.
Case 1. IDGSC-IN-SC
In this case, there is IDA, IDB /∈ Φ (That is IDA, IDB 6= 0), so f(IDA) =
f(IDB) = 1 and the scheme is actually a signcryption scheme. It is easy to
verify that:
w = eˆ(PPub, QB)
r = eˆ(X,SB);
eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(rP, r−1(h2P + h3 · SA) = eˆ(P, P )
h2 · eˆ(PPub, QA)
h3;
UC(IDA, IDB, SC(IDA, IDB, m)) = m.
So our scheme in signcryption mode is correct.
Case 2. IDGSC-IN-SG
In this case, there is IDA /∈ Φ, IDB ∈ Φ (That is IDA 6= 0, IDB = 0.), so
f(IDA) = 1, f(IDB) = 0. The generalized signcryption scheme in signature
mode is as follows:
Sign:
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||IDA||0) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2P + f(IDA) · h3 · SA) = r
−1(h2P + h3 · SA).
- Computes QB = H0(0) = ϑ and w = eˆ(PPub, ϑ)
r·f(IDB) = 1.
- Computes h1 = H1(w) = H1(1) = 0 and y = m||IDA||V ⊕ 0 = m||IDA||V .
- Outputs the signature(X,m||IDA||V ).
Verify:
- Computes h2 = H2(m||IDA||0) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P )h2 · eˆ(PPub, QA)
h3, if not, returns⊥.
In fact, the reduced signature scheme is the signature scheme, denoted
PSG, proposed by Paterson [14].
Case 3. IDGSC-IN-EN
In this case, there is IDA ∈ Φ, IDB /∈ Φ (That is IDA = 0, IDB 6= 0.), so
f(IDA) = 0, f(IDB) = 1. The generalized signcryption scheme in encryption
mode is as follows:
Encrypt:
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||0||IDB) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2P + f(IDA) · h3 · SA) = r
−1h2P .
- Computes QB = H0(IDB) and w = eˆ(PPub, QB)
r.
- Computes h1 = H1(w) and y = m||0||V ⊕ h1.
- Sends (X, y) to Bob.
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Decrypt:
- Computes f(IDB).
- Computes w = eˆ(X,SB)
f(IDB) = eˆ(X,SB) and h1 = H1(w).
- Computes m||0||V = y ⊕ h1.
- Computes h2 = H2(m||0||IDB) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P )h2. if not, returns⊥. Else, returns m.
Actually, the reduced encryption scheme is combination of the basic en-
cryption scheme, denoted BFE, proposed by Boneh and Franklin [1] and a
one-time signature scheme.
4. Efficiency Analysis and Security Results
4.1. Efficiency Analysis
The main purpose of generalized signcryption is to reduce implementa-
tion complexity. According to different application environments, generalized
signcryption can fulfill the function of signature, encryption or signcryption
respectively. However, the computation complexity may increase comparing
with normal signcryption scheme. Such as, [9, 16], these schemes all need
an additional secure MAC function which not only increase the computation
complexity but also the implementation complexity. Fortunately, this ad-
ditional requirements are not needed in our scheme. Moreover, our scheme
is as efficient as [5], which is the most efficient identity based signcryption
scheme. In Table 1 below we compare the computation complexity of our
scheme, denoted NIDGSC, with several famous signcryption schemes. We
use mul., exps. and cps. as abbreviations for multiplications, exponentia-
tions and computations respectively. Here, the computations that can be
pre-calculated will be denoted by (+?).
Schemes
Sign/Encrypt Decrypt/Verify
mul. exps. eˆ mul. exps. eˆ
in G1 in G2 cps. in G1 in G2 cps.
[13] 3 0 0(+1) 0 1 3(+1)
[12] 2 2 0(+2) 0 2 2(+2)
[3] 3 1 0(+1) 2 0 3(+1)
[7] 2 0 0(+2) 1 0 4
[5] 3 0 0(+1) 1 0 3
[11] 5 0 0(+1) 1 0 3(+1)
NIDGSC 3 1 0(+1) 0 2 2(+2)
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Table 1. Comparasion between the dominant operations required for IDGSC
and other schemes
4.2. Security Results
In this section we will state the security results for our scheme under the
security model defined in Section 2.2. Our results are all in the random oracle
model. In each of the results below we assume that the adversary makes qi
queries to Hi for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. qs and qu denote the number of Signcrypt and
Unsigncrypt queries made by the adversary respectively. n3 and n4 denote
the bit length of an element in group G1 and G2 respectively.
Theorem 1. If there is an EF-ACMA adversary A of NIDGSC in
signature-mode that succeeds with advantage advef−acma
Aidgsc−in−sg
(t, p), then there
is a simulator C that can forge valid signature of PSG with advantage
ξ ≈ advef−acma
Aidgsc−in−sg
(t, p).
When NIDGSC works as a signature scheme, it is actually the signa-
ture scheme, PSG, proposed by Paterson [14]. The PSG scheme itself is
EF-ACMA secure. Considering Signcrypt/Unsigncrypt query that is absent
in normal signature scheme, these queries are useless to the adversary of
NIDGSC-IN-SG. Because the identities of sender and receiver are included
in the signature. There are two ways to modify these values. First, the adver-
sary must to find a special Hash collision. Second, the adversary succeeds in
solving the ECDLP [6] problem. In such cases, the adversary has negligible
advantage to modify these values. So an EF-ACMA adversary can attack
PSG scheme if he can attack NIDGSC in signature mode.
Theorem 2. Let Advind−cca2
Aidgsc−in−en
(t, p) = ξ be advantage of an IND-CCA2
adversary A of NIDGSC in encryption-mode, then ξ is polynomial time neg-
ligible.
When NIDGSC works as an encryption scheme, it is actually the com-
bination of the basic identity based encryption scheme proposed by [1] and
a one-time signature scheme. Owing to the theorem proposed by Canetti
et al.[4], this combined encryption scheme is secure against normal adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attack. Considering Signcrypt/Unsigncrypt query, the ad-
versary can not transform the target encryption ciphertext into a valid sign-
cryption ciphertext. This conclusion is based on the EF-ACMA security of
PSG. So NIDGSC in encryption mode is IND-CCA2 secure.
Theorem 3. If A can forge valid signcryption ciphertext of NIDGSC in
signcryption-mode successfully with advantage Advef−acma
Aidgsc−insc
(t, p), then there
is a simulator C that can forge valid signature of PSG with advantage ξ:
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ξ > Advef−acma
Aidgsc−insc
(t, p) + (q1 · qs)/2
n4 + qu/(2
n2 · 2n1 · 2n3).
The corresponding proofs are given in Appendix A.
Theorem 4. If there is an IND-IBSC-CCA2 adversary A of NIDGSC
in signcryption-mode that succeeds with advantage Advind−cca2
Aidgsc−in−sc
(t, p), then
there is a challenger C running in polynomial time that solves the weak
BCDH problem with advantage ξ:
ξ > Advind−cca2
Aidgsc−in−sc
(t, p)/(q0·q1).
The definition of weak BCDH problem and corresponding proofs are given
in Appendix B.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we define the security model for IDGSC and propose an
efficient IDGSC which is proved secure under this security model. Compar-
ing with existing generalized signcryption schemes, our scheme doesn’t need
an extra secure MAC function. So it has less implementation complexity.
What’s more, it is almost as efficient as the normal signcryption scheme.
An interesting open question is to design a non-ID based (public key
or Certificateless) generalized signcryption scheme that does not need an
additional MAC function.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 3
We will reduce the attack to EF-ACMA of NIDGSC to EF-ACMA of
PSG proposed by Paterson [14]. Hence, we define two experiment Exp 1
and Exp 2. In each experiment, the private and public key and the Random
Oracle’s coin flipping space are not changed. The difference between Exp 1
and Exp 2 comes from rules of oracle service that challenger provides for the
adversary.
Exp 1
In this experiment, we use the standard technique to simulate Hash func-
tions used in our scheme. It is well-known that no adversary can distinguish
between this environment and the real environment in polynomially bounded
time. Let S0 denote the event that EF-ACMA adversary can attack NIDGSC
successfully in Exp 1.
Challenger C needs to keep four lists Li, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 which are vacant
at the very beginning. These lists are used to record answers to the corre-
sponding Hash Hi, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 query.
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Setup. At the beginning, challenger C runs the algorithm Setup(1k) and
acts as PKG. That is, he generates the global public system parameters
(params, PPub) and the master private key s. Then, he sends (params, PPub)
to the adversary A.
Probe. We now describe how the challenger simulates various queries.
Simulator: H0(IDU)
- If the record (IDU , QU , SU) is found in L0, then returns QU .
- Else chooses QU randomly from G
∗
1; computes SU = sQU ; stores (IDU , QU ,
SU) in L0 and returns QU .
Simulator: H1(w)
- Searches (w, h1) in the list L1. If such a pair is found, returns h1.
- Otherwise chooses h1 randomly from {0, 1}
n2 × {0, 1}n1 × G∗1, and puts
(w, h1) into L1 and returns h1.
Simulator: H2(m||IDA||IDB)
- Searches (m||IDA||IDB, h2) in List L2. If such a pair is found, returns h2.
- Otherwise chooses h2 randomly from Z
∗
q , and puts (m||IDA||IDB, h2) into
L2 and returns h2.
Simulator: H3(m||X)
- Searches (m||X, h3) in the list L3. If such a pair is found, returns h3.
- Otherwise chooses h3 randomly from Z
∗
q , and puts (m||X, h2) into L3 and
returns h3.
Simulator: Extract(IDU)
We assume that A makes the query H0(IDU) before it makes extract
query for IDU .
- Searches L0 for the entry (IDU , QU , SU) corresponding to IDU , and re-
sponds with SU .
Simulator: Sign(IDA, m), V erify(IDB, σ)
The challenger can easily answer these queries for the adversary. Because
the challenger initializes the system and he knows the master key. So he
can use signer IDA’s private key to sign message m and use the receiver
IDB’s public key to verify the signature σ faithfully according to IDGSC-IN-
SG. The only difference is substituting the above Hash simulators for Hash
functions.
Simulator: Encrypt(IDB, m), Decrypt(IDB, ε)
The challenger can get receiver IDB’s public key and private key. So he
can supply these services for the adversary. Also the Hash functions in the
scheme use the above Hash simulators.
Simulator: GSC(IDA, IDB, m), GUC(IDA, IDB, δ)
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The challenger can get sender IDA’s public key and private key and re-
ceiver IDB’s public key and private key. So he can supply these services for
the adversary. Here, the Hash functions also use the above Hash simulators.
Exp 2
In this experiment, we will remove the layer of encryption and reduce
the signcryption scheme to PSG scheme. In the Setup phase, the challenger
initializes the system just like he does in Exp 1. In the Probe phase, besides
following simulators, challenger acts same with Exp 1.
Simulator: Sign(IDA, m), V erify(IDB, σ)
Here, the challenger will follow PSG to accomplish these simulations.
Simulator: GSC(IDA, IDB, m)
Here, the challenger will keep another list Ls to record the GSC queries
that the adversary asks.
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||IDA||IDB) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2P + h3 · SA).
- Selects h1 uniformly from {0, 1}
n2 × {0, 1}n1 × G∗1 and adds (∗, h1) in List
L1. The first element is vacant, and will be given some value later.
- Computes y = m||IDA||V ⊕h1 and adds (X, y, V, IDA, IDB, m) to List Ls.
- Outputs ciphertext (X, y). (Here, h2, h3 come from the corresponding Hash
Simulators.)
Simulator: GUC(IDA, IDB, δ)
- Searches (∗||IDA||IDB, ∗) in the list L2, if such a record (m||IDA||IDB, h2)
is found, goes to the next step. Else, returns ⊥.
- Searches (m||∗, ∗) in the list L3, if such a record (m||X, h3) is found, goes
to the next step. Else, returns ⊥.
- Searches (X, ∗, ∗, IDA, IDB, m) in the list Ls, if such a record (X, y, V, IDA,
IDB, m) is found, goes to the next step. Else, returns ⊥.
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P )h2 · eˆ(PPub, QA)
h3, if not, returns ⊥.
- Else computes w = eˆ(X,SB) and h1 = y ⊕m||IDA||V .
- Searches (∗, h1) in the list L1, if such a record is found, the first element
defined to be w and returns m. Else, returns ⊥.
Now we discuss the difference between Exp 1 and Exp 2. The adversary
can distinguish Exp 1 with Exp 2 if following events happened. Firstly,
during the Signcrypt query, if the adversary has made the query H1(w),
where w happened to be the vacant value of some record. The probability
of such event happening is at most q1/2
n4. The adversary made qs Signcrypt
query. So the probability of such events happening is at most (q1 · qs)/2
n4 in
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total. Secondly, during the Unsigncrypt query, if the adversary has guessed
plaintext of some ciphertext. The probability of such event happening is at
most 1/(2n2 · 2n1 · 2n3). The adversary made qu Unsigncrypt query. So the
probability of such events happening is at most qu/(2
n2 · 2n1 · 2n3) in total.
Let S1 denote adversary can attack successfully in Exp 2. So, we have:
|Pr(S0)− Pr(S1)| ≤ (qh1 · qs)/2
n4 + qu/(2
n2 · 2n1 · 2n3)
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 4
Weak BCDH problem. (G1,+) and (G2, ·) are two cycle groups of
prime order q, P is a generator of G1, eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 is a bilinear map
between G1 and G2. Given (P, aP, bP, cP,
1
c
P ), where a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , the strong
BDH problem is to compute eˆ(P, P )abc.
Proof. If there is an IND-CCA2 adversary A of IDGSC in the sign-
cryption mode, then the challenger C can use it to solve the strong BDH
problem. Let (P, aP, bP, cP, 1
c
P ) be an instance of the weak BCDH problem
that C wants to solve. At first, C runs the Setup(1k) algorithm to produce
parameters params. It sets the public key as PPub = cP , although it doesn’t
know the master key c. And then C sends (params, PPub) to the adversary
A.
Besides the four lists Li, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, Challenger C also needs to keep
another list Ls which are used to record answers to the Signcrypt query.
Phase 1
Simulator: H0(IDU)
At the beginning, C chooses ib uniformly at random from 1, ...q0. We
assume that A doesn’t make repeat queries.
- If i = ib responds with H0(IDU) = bP and sets IDU = IDb.
- Else chooses k uniformly at random from Z∗q ; computes QU = kP and
SU = kPPub; stores (IDU , QU , SU , k) in L0 and responds with QU .
Simulator: H1(w)
- Searches (w, h1) in List L1. If such a pair is found, returns h1.
- Otherwise chooses h1 randomly from {0, 1}
n2 × {0, 1}n2 × G∗1, and puts
(w, h1) into L1 and returns h1.
Simulator: H2(m||ID1||ID2)
- Searches (m||ID1||ID2, h2) in List L2. If such a pair is found, returns h2.
- Otherwise chooses h2 randomly from Z
∗
q , and puts (m||ID1||ID2, h2) into
L2 and returns h2.
Simulator: H3(m||X)
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- Searches (m||X, h3) in the list L3. If such a pair is found, returns h3.
- Otherwise chooses h3 randomly from Z
∗
q , and puts (m||X, h3) into L3 and
returns h3.
Simulator: Extract(IDU)
We assume that A makes the query H0(IDU) before it makes extract
query for IDU .
- If IDU = IDb, aborts the simulation.
- Else, searches L0 for the entry (IDU , QU , SU , k) corresponding to IDU , and
responds with SU .
Simulator: Sign(ID1, m)
We assume that A makes the query H0(ID1) before Sign(ID1, m) query.
Case 1: ID1 6= IDb
- Find the entry (ID1, Q1, S1, k) in L0.
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||0) and h3 = H2(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2P + h3 · S1).
- Outputs (X,m||ID1||V ). (Here Hi, i = 2, 3, comes from the simulator
above. )
Case 2: ID1 = IDb
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rPPub.
- Computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||0) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2 ·
1
c
P + h3 · bP ).
- Outputs (X,m||ID1||V ). (Here Hi, i = 2, 3, comes from the simulator
above. )
Simulator: V erify(ID1, σ)
- Computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||0), If (m||ID1||0, h2) /∈ L2, returns ⊥.
- Computes h3 = H3(m||X), If (m||X, h3) /∈ L3, returns ⊥.
- If ID1 /∈ L0, returns ⊥; else computes Q0 = H0(ID1).
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P )h2 · eˆ(PPub, Q1)
h3, if not, returns ⊥. Else,
returns ⊤.
Simulator: Encrypt(ID2, m)
We assume that A has made the H0(ID2) query before Encrypt(ID2, m)
query.
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||0||ID2) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1h2P .
- Computes QB = H0(ID2) and w = eˆ(PPub, Q2)
r.
- Computes h1 = H1(w) and y = m||0||V ⊕ h1.
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- Outputs (X, y).(Here Hi, i=0,1,2,3, comes from the simulator above.)
Simulator: Decrypt(ID2, ε)
We assume that A makes the query H0(ID2) before Decrypt(ID2, ε).
Case 1: ID2 6= IDb
- Find the entry (ID2, Q2, S2, k) in L0.
- Computes w = eˆ(X,S2) and h1 = H1(w).
- If (w, h1) /∈ L1, returns ⊥. Else, computes m||0||V = y ⊕ h1.
- Computes h2 = H2(m||0||ID2), If (m||0||ID2, h2) /∈ L2, returns ⊥.
- Computes h3 = H3(m||X), If (m||X, h3) /∈ L3, returns ⊥.
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P )h2, if not, returns ⊥. Else, returns m.
Case 2: ID2 = IDb
Step through the list L1 with entries (w, h1) as follows:
- Computes m||0||V = y ⊕ h1.
- If m||0||ID2 ∈ L2, computes h2 = H2(m||0||ID2); else moves to the next
entry in L1 and begin again.
- If m||X ∈ L3, computes h3 = H3(m||X); else moves to the next entry in
L1 and begin again.
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P )h2. If so, returns m; else moves to the next
entry in L1 and begin again.
- If no message has been returned after stepping through L1, return ⊥.
Simulator: Signcrypt(ID1, ID2, m)
We assume that A makes the query H0(ID1) and H0(ID2) before making
signcrypt query using identity ID1 and ID2.
Case 1: ID1 6= IDb
- Find the entry (ID1, Q1, S1, k) in L0.
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||ID2) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2P + h3S1).
- Computes Q2 = H0(ID2) and w = eˆ(PPub, Q2)
r.
- Computes h1 = H1(w) and y = m||ID1||V ⊕ h1.
- Outputs (X, y).(Here Hi, i=0,1,2,3, comes from the simulator above.)
Case 2: ID1 = IDb
- Find the entry (ID2, Q2, S2, k) in L0.
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rPPub.
- Computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||ID2) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2 ·
1
c
P + h3 · bP ).
- Computes w = eˆ(X,S2), h1 = H1(w) and y = m||ID1||V ⊕ h1.
- Outputs (X, y).(Here Hi, i=1,2,3, comes from the simulator above.)
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Simulator: Unsigncrypt(ID1, ID2, ε)
We assume that A makes the query H0(ID1) and H0(ID2) before making
this query using these identities.
Case 1: ID2 6= IDb
- Find the entry (ID2, Q2, S2, k) in L0.
- Computes w = eˆ(X,S2) and h1 = H1(w).
- If (w, h1) /∈ L1, returns ⊥. Else, computes m||ID1||V = y ⊕ h1.
- Computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||ID2), If (m||ID1||ID2, h2) /∈ L2, returns ⊥.
- Computes h3 = H3(m||X), If (m||X, h3) /∈ L3, returns ⊥.
- If ID1 = ID2 or ID1 /∈ L0, returns ⊥; else computes Q1 = H0(ID1).
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P )h2 · eˆ(PPub, Q1)
h3, if not, returns ⊥. Else,
returns m.
Case 2: ID2 = IDb
Step through the list L1 with entries (w, h1) as follows:
- Computes m||ID1||V = y ⊕ h1.
- If ID1 = ID2 or ID1 /∈ L0, moves to the next entry in L1 and begin again;
else computes Q1 = H0(ID1).
- If m||ID1||ID2 ∈ L2, computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||ID2); else moves to the
next entry in L1 and begin again.
- If m||X ∈ L3, computes h3 = H3(m||X); else moves to the next entry in
L1 and begin again.
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P )h2 · eˆ(PPub, Q1)
h3. If so, returns m; else moves
to the next entry in L1 and begin again.
- If no message has been returned after stepping through L1, return ⊥.
Challenge. At the end of Phase 1, the adversary A outputs two iden-
tities, IDA and IDB, two messages, m1 and m2. If IDB 6= IDb, aborts
the simulation; else it sets X∗ = aP and then chooses γ ∈ {0, 1}, and
y∗ ∈ {0, 1}n2 × {0, 1}n2 × G∗1 at random. At last, it returns the challenge
ciphertext δ∗ = (X∗, y∗) to A.
Phase 2.
The queries made by in Phase 2 are responded in the same way as those
made by in Phase 1. Here, the queries follow the restrictions that are defined
in Game 6.
Guess.
At the end of Phase 2, A outputs a bit γ
′
. If γ
′
= γ, the challenger C
outputs the answer to the weak BCDH problem:
w∗ = eˆ(X∗, SB) = eˆ(P, P )
abc
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Let’s analyze the probability that the simulation can succeed. There are
two simulators need to be noted. First, in the challenge stage, the simulator
hopes that the adversary chosen IDb as the target recipient identity. This will
be the case with probability at least 1/q0. If this is not the case, there will be
an error when the adversary tried to make query Extract(IDb). Second, in
Phase 2, if the adversary makes query H1(w = eˆ(P, P )
abc), the simulation will
fail. However, with probability 1/q1 the challenger can guess the answer of
weak BCDH problem from the records in List L1. From the above remarks
we conclude that the challenger can solve the weak BCDH problem with
probability at least: Advind−cca2
Aidgsc−in−sc
(t, p)/(q0·q1).
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